

Conclusion

Phil 255

In the beginning

- Philosophy of Mind (PoM), in its present form, is young
 - Present form: highly informed by sciences of the mind
 - Those sciences are young, especially neuroscience
 - Neuroscience is 'data rich and theory poor'
- 20th C. has been tumultuous for PoM, probably because of its changing face
- Lyon's analyzes this change using three dichotomies:
 - internalism/externalism
 - monism/dualism
 - reductionism/anti-reductionism

Internalism/externalism & monism/dualism

- Internal theories assume minds are 'in the head'
- External theories assume minds are part of the observable world
- Dualist theories assume mind and matter are distinct substances
- Monist theories assume there is one substance (mind, matter, ?)
- Introspectionism: internal (dualist)
- Behaviourism: external (monist)
- Identity theory: internal (monist)
- Functionalism: internal ('theoretical' dualist)
- Lesson: monism, but how do psych. and physic. theories relate?

Reductionism/anti-reductionism

- Most reductionist:
 - eliminative materialists
- Sort of reductionist:
 - Dennett/Davidson: instrumentalist/normative
- This is in contrast to Lyons
 - Lyons clearly misreads Dennett
 - Doesn't seem to realize explanations are for purposes
 - Or perhaps, doesn't realize he is uncritically preferring a particular kind of purpose.
 - Makes a poor case for claim that neural reduction is 'useless'

Science & scientism

- Lyons mistakenly equates naturalism with the view that physics is the ultimate science
 - Fodor is a perfect counter-example (naturalist, anti-unity)
- Lyons makes more false claims:
 - neuroscience hasn't affected psychology
 - neurophysiology has had enough time to try
 - neuro. not shedding light on beliefs, etc. shows this
 - the most 'useful' explanations are psychological

Consciousness

- The problem that won't go away
 - It had for a while (behaviourism)
 - Never left in continental philosophy
 - Nagel (& co.) brought it back
- Lyons is mistaken that analytic philosophers don't consider it special (epistemologically, at least)
- Lyons' solution is very odd
- Clearly, the problem won't go away

Metaphysics & minds

- Lyons concludes by discussing Rorty
 - Rorty claims the mind/matter distinction should go
 - Then the mind/body problem goes two
 - Metaphysical point is generally accepted
 - Epistemological point is generally rejected
 - Why not have many descriptions? What's the replacement?
- From the metaphysical point it follows there is no 'essence' to mindfulness
 - Lyons gives descriptive, normative, authoritative criteria
 - Result: the category is metaphysically subjective
- Science: determine the 'kind of mind' and we make it 'real' or not

Question
